It is not the first time that a diplomatic flurry has been triggered around Karabakh. The summit meetings between President Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev are too many to keep track of. Every time meetings are held on the presidential or foreign ministerial levels, documents are drafted and then shelved for indefinite periods. These meetings have almost become a routine and no one expects a breakthrough in the deadlocked situation any time soon.
Like many other “frozen” conflicts, Karabakh has become a hostage to the major powers’ interests. Meetings and discussions intensify whenever one or two powers that have a stake in the conflict perceive an opportunity in its resolution. Then, more important issues take over and Karabakh is once again relegated to the back burner.
It seems that this time around, two factors are igniting the interest of the parties to revisit the issue. One is Turkey’s desire to join the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which only Moscow can deliver, and the other is Moscow’s desire to lure Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which only Ankara can deliver.
All these expectations and anticipations form the background of the revival of the diplomatic activities.
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently met in Sochi and wrapped up many economic and political deals. Not too long ago, they were at each other’s throats. On the eve of that meeting, Putin announced that relations between Russia and Turkey have been fully restored.
Turkey was on the verge of economic collapse when Russia blocked almost all commercial activities between the two countries after the Turkish air force shot down a Russian military plane in 2015. Turkey backed down, desperately searching for an honorable way out.
On the other hand, Washington and Brussels were tightening the noose around Russia through economic sanctions and military build-up around Russia’s periphery. Thus, Erdogan’s policy tilt toward Moscow gave a much-needed respite in its isolation, while giving a black eye to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by Ankara’s virtual divorce from the alliance.
The Syrian battleground became the theater to bring both countries’ interests to converge, as the Russia-Turkey-Iran tandem brought the Syrian war to its conclusion, relegating the US to a marginal role.
Erdogan’s appetite was whetted for other possible deals through the same channel.
Therefore, Karabakh was one of the frozen issues which both countries had an interest in and its resolution could yield dividends for both parties.
After the Sochi meeting, Erdogan disclosed that talks were carried out about the Armenian side ceding five of the seven regions under the control of Karabakh forces. This is a recurring theme for the Turkish side, since the days of the protocols in Switzerland, when Ahmet Davutolgu, then foreign minister of Turkey, was asking the Armenian side to cede at least one region as a good will gesture without any counteroffer.
Those strategic regions serve as a security guarantee in the war zone and as well as a diplomatic chip at the negotiation table.
Following the meeting of the Russian and Turkish presidents, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Baku and Yerevan, where he did not make any earth-shaking announcements.
He certainly dashed Erdogan’s expectations when he stated that the Minsk group format is just fine and that any expansion may turn out to be a “spoiler.” On the other hand, he indicated that Moscow would be pleased to see Azerbaijan in the EEU and CIS. “The EEU is an open integration alliance, said Lavrov, adding, “We do not force anyone to join us. … We always welcome accession of new members.”
Russia’s top diplomat made almost identical statements in both capitals of Yerevan and Baku: “No one is satisfied with the conflict, and a solution should be sought for, all the more so because many areas that are expected to bring results have already been outlined,” he stressed.
This even-handed diplomacy gave no one any cause to cheer. The only relief came from a different quarter warning against Azerbaijan’s bellicose posture. The Russian Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev reminded Aliyev of Georgia’s 2008 adventure, implying that any resumption of hostilities may only help formalize Karabakh’s split from Azerbaijan. Indeed, in 2008, Georgia’s former president, Mikhail Saakashvili, backed his hostile rhetoric with bullets, providing a much-needed opportunity to Moscow to move its tanks into Georgian territory to “save” South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which today have become unrecognized republics in the Caucasus.
The Karabakh conflict is an intractable problem for two major reasons. One is the unwillingness of the major parties to resolve it, to use the issue in their favor at the opportune time, and the second is that the premises of the issue are misstated when they try to reconcile the principle of self-determination with the principle of territorial integrity. Once the diplomatic community accepts that Karabakh was never a part of Azerbaijan’s territory then reconciliation of the two principles will be resolved.
The fact that no resolution has yet been achieved sometimes reflects on the diplomats themselves. Some people who think Armenia must have the silver bullet for the problem blame Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, who is a consummate diplomat, on par with his peers from the major powers.
Recently speaking at a joint press conference in Yerevan with his Brazilian counterpart, Nalbandian commented on the upcoming declaration of the 28 European Union ambassadors planning to meet on November 24 in Brussels. The declaration has hit a snag which Armenia’s foreign minister has delineated in a deft definition that Baku’s issue is not with Armenia; it is with the EU, whose stand Azerbaijan has been fighting.
Despite intense diplomatic movement, no one in the Caucasus is holding his or her breath for a breakthrough any time soon.
Turkey and Azerbaijan have become pariah states. If the concerned parties can recognize them as such, maybe, we hope peace will be in the offing. Edmond Y. Azadian
