By Suren Sargsyan published in The Armenian Mirror of Spectator
The Biden administration has actively mediated efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia and Turkey. These situations are closely linked, whether we like it or not. Outgoing President Joe Biden urged Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to finalize a peace agreement by year-end, likely aiming to boost his reputation as a mediator and dealmaker. If Harris would have won, the Democrats’ political course would likely have continued, but this prospect seems doubtful with Trump.
Aliyev probably disregarded Biden’s letter, as Azerbaijan is not keen on a peace treaty that would limit his ambitions and constrain his options. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia urgently needs to sign a peace agreement as quickly as possible.
Afterward, it is likely that the Armenian leadership will focus all resources on domestic political processes, such as organizing elections to legitimize the peace agreement and other painful concessions. These concessions may include renouncing elements of the Declaration of Independence, the symbolic image of Mount Ararat on the Armenian coat of arms, and other national and historical values.
Realistically, two scenarios arise concerning the peace process.
Delaying the Peace Agreement
The Trump administration may hesitate to quickly finalize the agreement, as doing so would imply crediting the Biden administration — or at least sharing that credit with the Democrats. Alternatively, Trump could continue negotiations and delay the signing to claim the credit himself, especially as he seeks successful peace narratives and success stories for his record. This delay would also align with Baku’s interests, enabling Azerbaijan to press Armenia for more while experiencing less external pressure, especially from the US.
Limited US Involvement in the South Caucasus
A second scenario involves Trump showing little to no active engagement in the South Caucasus, leaving regional initiatives to Russia, Turkey, and Iran. This scenario also serves Baku’s interests since Azerbaijan would not face external pressure and, unlike Armenia, is capable of successfully negotiating with Tehran, Ankara, and Moscow. However, such a scenario could destabilize the region by removing the US as a balancing actor, thereby increasing the influence of the dominant regional powers such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran. This scenario seems more ambitious, particularly if Trump negotiates an agreement with Putin on Ukraine. Such a deal would likely include a comprehensive package addressing their mutual interests and concerns globally, including the strategically important South Caucasus region for Russia.
However, if we look at all this from a more global perspective, particularly in terms of US-Russia relations and in the context of the South Caucasus, there is a further possibility: heightened tensions surrounding Iran potentially may turn the region into a “thoroughfare” with all the associated negative consequences. If Russia and the US fail to reach a consensus on Ukraine, and Washington takes more aggressive actions against Iran, Armenia will face new and profound challenges, particularly in the realm of security. This would be the biggest challenge that Armenia will face after the war in 2020.
Such potential developments will largely depend on the priorities and policies of a Trump-led administration in handling regional and international affairs in general. Predicting future actions is challenging due to Trump’s silence on the matter. The situation is further complicated by the recent meeting between Trump and Biden, where Biden reportedly aimed to persuade Trump to support Ukraine. However, shortly after the meeting, Biden authorized the deployment of American long-range missiles against Russia, which Trump’s son criticized as an “imbecile decision.” This suggests that they did not come to an agreement on this issue.
