When a cease-fire agreement was reached in May 1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan through Russia’s mediation, no one had the illusion that the specter of war had dissipated from South Caucasus. The bone of contention between the two adversaries, namely Nagorno Karabagh, became one of the “frozen conflicts” emerging in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
But the recent escalation of tensions across the border of the two countries is testing many assumptions and some alliances.
Speeches delivered at the United Nations’ General Assembly marking the 70th anniversary of that world body by Armenia’s President Serge Sargisian’s and Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov did not give any indication that peace was at hand; on the contrary, both speeches concluded with veiled threats of war.
The fact that Nagorno Karabagh has never been an integral part of Azerbaijan’s territory has not received traction in any international forum. Even during the Soviet period, the region had the status of an autonomous oblast under Baku’s jurisdiction, rather than Azeri territory. Notwithstanding Nariman Narimanov’s statement, after Azerbaijan’s Sovietization, Karabagh, Zangezur and Nakhijevan are part of Armenia’s territory proper for perpetuity. Narimanov was the Azeri leader in the immediate post-Soviet era Azerbaijan. Only in 1920, the British government convinced Karabagh’s Consultative Council to accept Azerbaijani tutelage, until its final status could be determined by the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920). Ever since, Armenians in Karabagh have been waiting for the legal status of their ancestral land.
Armenia’s strategic ally, Russia, has not endorsed the principle that Karabagh broke away from Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union through the same legal vehicle (the Soviet constitution) which Baku implemented in dissolving its ties with the Union, thus rendering the Helsinki final act into a rectangular wheel which supposedly will resolve the self-determination of Karabagh people without compromising Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
Even four UN resolutions on the issue have assumed Karabagh was an integral part of Azerbaijan’s territory, making Armenia’s challenge an uphill legal battle. These resolutions were passed through Turkey’s political manipulations and with the votes of the members of the Islamic Conference, in which Ankara and Baku are members.
The politics around the conflict are based on the above legal parameters.
Since the signing of the ceasefire, the resolution of the conflict has been consigned to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, with the co-chairmanship of Russia, the US and France.
For the last two decades, the Minsk Group has been engaged in shuttle diplomacy, spinning its wheels to no avail. One aspect of the group which has been consistent was that thus far they have spoken with one voice. This is no longer true.
Several meetings between the presidents of the two countries, in locales as varied as Key West, Astana, Madrid and Moscow — through OSCE — have not been able to achieve a breakthrough.
During the recent cross-border skirmishes, however, new and dangerous weapons systems have been introduced from Turkey. The violation of the ceasefire has been accompanied by louder rhetoric of bellicose statements and not only by third-class government officials. President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan himself has been claiming not only the Karabagh territory, but also the sovereign territory of Armenia. Backing his words with action, Aliyev’s army has been attacking the civilization population in the Tavoush region of Armenia and violating the ceasefire on the Armenia-Nakhijevan border.
An editorial in lragir.am on October 1 suggests, “Of course Aliyev could be constrained by the OSCE Minsk Group, but obviously the group has not consensus on this. It is clear that the Russian policy is encouraging Azerbaijan to seek new violations.”
That there is discord within the Minsk Group is apparent from the fact that the American co-chair James Warlick has been issuing individual comments, apparently with no coordination with his colleagues. One such persistent statements has pushed forth the argument that Armenian side has to cede the seven regions around Karabagh, which had been occupied as a strategic buffer to guarantee the security of the Karabagh people and their armed forces.
That mantra had begun earlier by Turkey’s then-Foreign Minister Mehmet Davutoglu, after the collapse of the Turkish-Armenian protocols in Zurich in 2009 that in order to demonstrate its flexibility, the Armenian side has at least to evacuate one region. In both cases, there has been no suggestion of a reciprocal move by the Azeri side. Compromise means two consenting parties making reciprocal concessions to reach a common goal. Concession by one party does not lead to a solution.
Thus far, the retaliation from the Armenian side has been swift and punishing. But Azerbaijan needs the war rhetoric, if not he war. The dictatorial regime has been severely criticized by the European Union and the US for human rights violations.
Despite the obscenely opulent lifestyle of the ruling Aliyev clan, more than700,000 Azeris are domestic refugees kept in abject poverty in order to divert the world’s attention to their “foreign enemy.”
Recent war games on Armenia’s borders with the participation of Turkish, Azeri and Georgian armed forces intend to demonstrate that Armenian is an isolated country, which is not far from the truth. That situation is exacerbated by Armenia’s rapid depopulation, which has pleased Aliyev tremendously. He has indicated many times that Azerbaijan can wait until Armenia becomes an easy prey through its depopulation.
Recent comments by Turkey have inflamed the already-volatile situation. Indeed, the chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Hulusi Akar, has stated: “Turkey will support Azerbaijan in the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.”
Adding insult to injury is the Russian equivocation when Armenia’s security is in question. Armenia is a partner with Russia in the Customs Union. Also, it is a strategic ally in the CSTO. The other members of the CSTO, namely Kazakhstan and Belarus, continue their relations with Azerbaijan and they issue generic statements in view of the ceasefire violations. The Russian military base in Gumri is supposed to protect Armenia in case of an attack. Baku has diverted its fire from Karabagh to Armenia proper, yet we still have to hear a comment from our Russian ally.
The previously mentioned editorial in Lragir further comments on Armenian-Russian relations: “And when a de jure ally and friend is de facto arming the enemy, turning on a green light for the aggression of the enemy, especially that de facto alliance with the United States is becoming more than important.”
Azerbaijan also buys its armaments from Turkey and especially drones from Israel. One Israeli expert, Dr. Alexander Tsinker, has revealed: “We supply hardware to Azerbaijan, but it is only business. I have talked to Armenian colleagues and told them if Armenia wants, it also can purchase necessary hardware from Israel, but Armenia’s answer was confused, saying that it is a CSTO member” and armaments are not compatible with CSTO systems.
What Davutoglu and Warlick have been suggesting has also found its echo with President Putin. During the last one-on-one meeting President Putin told Armenian President Serge Sargisian that in order to ease tensions, Armenia has to relinquish control of seven regions around Karabagh unilaterally, without any guarantees on the future status of Karabagh. This is the real test of Armenian-Russian military treaty. Moscow has long been trying to introduce Russian peacekeeping forces in Karabagh to consolidate its military position in the Caucasus. The Armenian side has been resisting that policy, with the argument that its armed forces can guarantee the security of the two Armenian republics an indeed, despite Armenia’s alarming depopulation, today’s wars are won through technology and strategy. Military analysts believe that Armenia still possesses the strategic edge. However, no one can tell for how long.
Russia has its hands full in Ukraine and Syria, but more often than not, second fronts of war are triggered in this kind of confusing situations.
The last thing Armenia needs is a new war. Even if Armenia wins, it will be costly and bloody.
